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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will
X deposits his money in a savings account in a bank or savings
and loan association in his own name as trustee for Y. The account
reads: "X as trustee for Y." He intends to reserve a power to withdraw any amount he wishes at any time, and also a power to revoke
the trust altogether. Y may or may not be aware of the deposit. X
retains the passbook. What X is trying to do is to keep complete
power over the deposit during his lifetime, with whatever remains
at his death to go to Y if Y is then alive. This is known as a
"Totten" or tentative trust, the name Totten coming from the style
of one of the early cases to recognize such an arrangement as valid.'
The Totten trust has now been recognized by court decision or
statute in a number of states, including California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington.2 The Restatement of Trusts also recognizes it.' A mere
handful of modern decisions reject it.4
'Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
2
Brucks v. Home Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951); Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A.2d
383 (Ch. 1943); In re Scott's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1951);
Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Wilder v. Howard, 188
Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2
(1950); Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 At. 317 (1936); Cohen v.
Newton Say. Bank, 320 Mass. 90, 67 N.E.2d 748 (1946); Coughlin v.
Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937);
Howard Say. Institution v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 183 A.2d 401 (1962); Its re
Pavlinko, 399 Pa. 536, 160 A.2d 554 (1960) ; Leader Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Hamilton, 46 Tenn. App. 368, 330 S.W.2d 33 (1959); In re Estate of
Madsen, 48 Wash. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956).
' RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1959) [Hereinafter cited as RESTAT.
TRUSTS].

"Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a

bank or other savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any
part of the deposit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his own
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke the trust, the intended
trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to
any part remaining on deposit on his death if he has not revoked the trust."
Id. at 155.
" Springvale Nat. Bank v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 Atl. 529 (1923);
Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N.H. 364 (1879); Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex.
340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943); see Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d
512 (1959).
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This trust is upheld as a convenient and safe way of disposing
of money, especially small sums. At the death of the depositor
(settlor), evidence is admissible to show that the trust was revocable,
irrevocable, or that it really was not a trust at all (for example, that
the account was placed in this form to deceive the bank or creditors).
If there is no evidence other than the words of the deposit card,
courts generally rule that the inference favors a revocable trustTotten.5
Under a Totten trust, the surviving beneficiary takes the remaining deposit subject to certain claims. X's creditors can get at the
account during X's lifetime and even after his death.' The account
is liable for funeral and other estate expenses, at least to the extent
that the estate cannot meet these expenses. 7 There is conflict as
to whether the remaining deposit is included in the decedent's estate
for purposes of ascertaining the widow's statutory share,8 the better
reasoning supporting its inclusion, but with her share to be taken
first out of other assets. The deposit doubtless counts in the decedent's estate for estate and death tax purposes in the same manner
as a revocable trust, due to the amount of control the settlor retains.
It is not necessary that the passbook be delivered to the beneficiary,
and it is not necessary that he even be aware of the trust.' In fact,
delivery of the passbook to the beneficiary may be evidence of an
irrevocable trust or of an inter vivos gift, in which case the incidents
connected with the deposit would be quite different. 10 In the event
of such delivery to Y, evidence would be received to show the
purpose of the act; thus delivery of the passbook to the beneficiary
' Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199 (1939) ; Matter of Totten,
179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); RESTAT. TRUSTS § 58, comment a (2d
ed. 1959).
'Matter of Halbauer, 34 Misc. 2d 458, 228 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Surr. Ct.
1962); Matter of Palyo, 187 Misc. 884, 62 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1946); Matter
of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N.Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937); RESTAT.
TRUSTS § 58, comment c (2d ed. 1959). This result is justified on the
basis of the amount of control the depositor keeps.
"Matter of Aybar, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Surr. Ct. 1952);
Matter of Halbauer, note 6 supra; RESTAT. TRUSTS § 58.
"Cf. RESTAT. TRusTs § 58, comment e (2d ed. 1959) ; Matter of Halpern,
303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). The argument for including the
account is that the depositor's control is so great that the account was for
this purpose, his property.
9
Annots., 157 A.L.R. 925 (1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
"0If the deposit were held to be a gift the depositor's creditors, wife, etc.,
would not be able to get at the deposit; further, the depositor would be liable
for any withdrawals he made.
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will not of itself prevent the deposit from being considered a Totten
trust.
Even though there are no withdrawals by the depositor, he may
revoke by words or acts that indicate a revocation;" for example,
the depositor's pledging of the passbook on a loan may amount to
revocation.' 2 He may also revoke by will if it is clear that this
was the intent; but if there is no mention of the deposit, a general
residuary clause by itself will not act as a revocation. 8 Where the
depositor becomes insane, his guardian can revoke only if necessary
for the welfare of the depositor.' 4
The Totten trust thus bears a close resemblance to an inter
vivos trust in which the settlor is trustee and in which he reserves
full right to amend and revoke; the unusual feature in the Totten
arrangement is the amount of control the depositor retains. When
the settlor of the Totten trust withdraws money for his own use, he
is in effect revoking the trust as to that amount (pro tanto). Creditors have even greater rights under the Totten trust, for normally
creditors of the settlor cannot get at a trust merely because it is
revocable or amendable. 5
The fundamental objection to the Totten trust is the charge
that it violates the statute of wills, that it is testamentary. This
charge is based on the amount of control which the depositor
retains.' An ordinary inter vivos trust certainly would be in danger
'1 Brucks v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal.2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951) (unmailed letter revoked); In re Onody's Will, 33 Misc. 2d
497, 226 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Matter of Stelma, 25 Misc. 2d 234,
201 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Surr. Ct. 1960). Cf. In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d
502 (Surr. Ct. 1944) (unmailed letter not revoked). See Annot., 38

A.L.R.2d 1234 (1954).

" Evinger v. MacDougall, 28 Cal. App. 2d 175, 82 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1938).
" Brucks v. Home Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d

545 (1951); Matter of Ludwig, 207 Misc. 860, 140 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Surr.
Ct. 1955); In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Surr. Ct. 1944). See also

Matter of Ginsburg, 27 Misc. 2d 586, 213 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surr. Ct. 1961)
(passbook in safe-deposit box and will leaves contents of safe-deposit box to

d third person); Matter of Athanasiou, 24 Misc. 2d 12, 202 N.Y.S.2d 675

(Surr. Ct. 1960).
1
" Simmons v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C.
1955) ; Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); REsTAT. TRusTs § 58, comment c (2d ed. 1959).
" Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879). See Scott, The Effects of a
Power to Revoke a Trust, 57 HARv. L. Rv. 362 (1944); Annot., 92 A.L.R.

282 (1934).

"6The argument that such a trust is testamentary due to the amount of
control retained by the settlor may be put another way. Due to the control
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if so much control were retained by the settlor, although courts are
now more liberal in this respect than formerly.1
But due to the
nature of a savings account, and due to the societal need for and
safety of such a simple device for disposing of small sums of money,
courts such as those of New York have recognized the Totten
arrangement. They simply say that this is a safe and useful method
and that it should be upheld. In the Totten decision in 1904 the
court wrote:
A brief review of the cases will show how the subject has been
gradually developed so as to accord with the methods of the
multitude of persons who make deposits in these banks ....
It is necessary for us to settle the conflict by laying down such
a rule as will best promote the interests of all the people in the
8
state.'
Professor Scott writes:
In view . . . of the convenience of this method of disposing of
comparatively small sums of money without the necessity of
resorting to probate proceedings, there seems to be no sufficiently
strong policy to invalidate these trusts. Not only is the amount
involved usually comparatively small, but it is easy to identify,
and there is no great danger of fraudulent claims resulting from
the absence of an attested instrument.' 9
The validity of the Totten arrangement requires a finding of a
present interest in the beneficiary. To be sure, some courts use
language which indicates that the beneficiary receives no interest
until the death of the settlor, but this is unsound for it does marked
violence to the statute of wills; further, in such case a later will
would ordinarily revoke the trust. The correct view is that the
beneficiary now receives an interest, with enjoyment both postponed
and tentative.2 0 In this light, the argument that the trust is testamentary falls.
retained, no interest in the property passes to the intended beneficiary until
the death of the settlor; thus the trust is testamentary and must meet the
statute of wills. It is fundamental that to have an inter vivos trust, a present
interest must now pass to the beneficiary-although enjoyment may be postponed.
"' See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d
113 (1944); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956). (Settlor
retained life interest; right to amend, revoke, and change the beneficiary; he
was also trustee. Upheld as valid instrument.)
18 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 120, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 750, 752 (1904).
19 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 58.3 at 484-85 (1956).
20 See Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959). This de-
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It should be noted that the Totten arrangement is a trust, not a
gift;21 also, that it is not the same thing as a joint bank account
with right of survivorship. The latter, by contract, may be used
in North Carolina to leave money to the survivor ;22 but, except in
a husband-wife situation which is covered by a recent statute,2 3
such accounts are fraught with risk.24 It may also be noted that a
number of states, including North Carolina, 5 provide by statute that
when a deposit is made in a savings bank by one person in trust
for a second person, and no further notice is given to the bank
as to purpose or intent, the bank may pay the remaining deposit to
the beneficiary on the prior death of the trustee. These statutes
often have been enacted merely for the protection of the bank, and
a number of courts have held that the statute does not validate the
payment as between the beneficiary and the representative of the
decedent's estate.26 I would think that the North Carolina statute
is merely to protect the bank."
I find no evidence that North Carolina has even considered the
Totten arrangement as such. One case,2s and no doubt others, contained a situation where the principles might have been applied
but they were not mentioned. The courts themselves have taken the
lead in New York and other states in accepting the Totten trust.
If the matter is properly presented, I see no reason why the North
Carolina courts should refuse to endorse this salutary device. Furcision, in dictum, incorrectly applies the Totten principles, for this was

clearly a Totten trust, but the dictum does illustrate the principle that an
interest must pass now.
(delivery
2" See Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959)
of passbook to beneficiary).
2 Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1961)
24 The North Carolina decisions on joint bank accounts with right of survivorship are in confusion. A lawyer takes his reputation in his hands when
he advises one without the most careful draftsmanship. Smith v. Smith,
255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961); Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 778,
39 S.E.2d 599 (1946). Cf. Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111
S.E.2d 875 (1960).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-59 (1960).
" O'Hara v. O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1935).
279

8

N.C.L. REv. 13 (1930).

1n Wescott v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank, 227 N.C. 39, 40 S.E.2d 461
(1946) a soldier overseas mailed money to a bank in the state to be placed
on savings, and if he died, the money was to go to his grandfather. The
soldier wrote the bank that the money was to be a "trust." His language is
not quite apt for the typical Totten deposit but the court might well have
decided the case on that theory and thereby carried out the wishes and plans
for a soldier killed in a foreign land.
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ther, I see no reason why our courts would not follow the broad
approach of the Restatement of Trusts and of the New York courts.
There is no basis for a contentious approach.
Assuming that the North Carolina courts accept the Totten
trust, the lawyer is faced with the problem of draftsmanship for
the deposit. A simple deposit reading "John Doe in trust for
Richard Roe" should prima facie establish a Totten trust, subject
to the rules of evidence and proof regarding a contrary intent
mentioned earlier. To add a variety of provisions on the card regarding right to control, etc., may result in the trust being held
tb be testamentary. On the other hand it is desirable, I believe,
that direct evidence of the Totten intent appear on the deposit card
as this may avoid a lawsuit after death. I would add the following
in readable size type:
It is the intent of the depositor, John Doe, to establish a "Totten"
trust. The depositor is to have full power to withdraw all or
part of the funds deposited at any time, and to revoke at any
time. On the death of the depositor, if the beneficiary be then
living, the bank is authorized to pay the balance in the the account
to such beneficiary, such beneficiary to then own the account
fully and absolutely.
In my opinion the Totten trust is the sort of development that
can best be worked out by the courts rather than by a state statute.
The courts can mold and shape and give life and adapt. However,
there is enough court history in other states for guidance, and so
it may be that a statute would be the safe way out for this state.
If there is to be a statute, I would suggest that the exact words of
section fifty-eight of the Restatement of Trusts be used.29
THOiMAS W.

CHRISTOPHER*

Criminal Law-Confessions-Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence
IIt is the general rule in the United States that a felony conviction
may not be based upon a naked extrajudicial confession of guilt, uncorroborated by any other evidence.1 Most decisions concerning
" General references on Totten Trust: 1 ScoTT,
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

TRUSTS

§ 58-58.5; 1

§ 47 (1951); Annots., 157 A.L.R. 925

(1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84'(1954); Pate v. State,
36 Ala. App. 688, 63 So. 2d 223 (1953); State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163,
43 A.2d 76 (1945). See generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde

